Elkhart’s Lusher Street Superfund Site Requires Aditional Remedial Action

Lusher StreetThe Elkhart Truth reports that the EPA has determined that about 70 properties on the city’s near-west side should be connected to city water because of groundwater contamination. The Environmental Protection Agency is also suggesting 200 homes inside the Lusher Superfund site need to have vapor removal systems installed to reduce dangerous vapors related to the contamination that can seep through basement walls and foundations.  The cost is estimated at $2.8 million.  You can find the story here.


EPA: $1M in Grants for Lake Michigan Water Quality

The EPA also announced $1 million in grants to fund two green infrastructure projects on Chicago’s North Side with the aim of improving water quality in Lake Michigan. The city plans to use a $812,000 grant to install bioswales and permeable pavement in a parking area at Montrose Beach on the North Side. The aim of that project is to annually filter more than four million gallons of stormwater in order to reduce the amount of stormwater contamination that currently leaches into the lake. In addition to that project, the city plans to use a $188,000 grant to install infrastructure along Leland Avenue in the Uptown area. The street runs through the north side neighborhood to the lakefront. The aim of the endeavor is to prevent almost 900,000 gallons of untreated stormwater from entering the city’s sewer system each year and prevent basement flooding in area structures. The Chicago Tribune has the story here.

Posted in Clean Water, EPA, Hazardous Waste, Real Estate

IDEM’s Tom Easterly Says the Obama Climate Change Plan is Bad for Indiana

The Northwest Indiana TimesTom Easterly reports that IDEM’s Tom Easterly believes that the Obama Administration climate change plan is bad for Indiana. An interesting position from the official charged with enforcement of Indiana’s environmental code. You can find the story here.

Easterly was appointed by former Gov. Mitch Daniels – who is no fan of EPA policies. Gov. Mike Pence – who holds similar views to Daniels – kept Easterly as IDEM’s chief official.

Posted in Clean Air, Climate Change, IDEM

Seventh Circuit Finds that Title Company Complied with Escrow Instructions

real estate developmentFrom the Seventh Circuit we have Edelman vs. Belco Title & Escrow, finding that a title company complied with its escrow instructions and had no liability to an investor in the real estate project.  

Plaintiffs invested $3 million in a multi‐use real‐estate project in Caseyville, Illinois called Forest Lakes. Their agreement with the developers promised a first‐priority mortgage, but they received only a junior mortgage. Meridian Bank had previously acquired a $20M mortgage on Forest Lakes in 2005. The plaintiffs lost their entire investment when the bank foreclosed in 2009. They sued Belco – the title company – which had done the title work for the Forest Lakes transactions, including the Meridian mortgage. None of the plaintiffs’ $3 million were ever escrowed with Belco, but went directly to the developer. Belco had no contact with the plaintiffs, before, during, or after the closing.

The development failed. Plaintiffs alleged Illinois state‐law claims of breach of fiduciary duty against Belco, claiming that as the “closing agent” for the transaction, Belco owed a duty to disclose that they were not receiving the first‐priority mortgage. The trial court granted summary judgment for Belco, finding that Belco was the plaintiffs’ agent for the purposes of the escrow and closing. Under Illinois law the title company owed only the very limited duty “to act only according to the terms of the escrow instructions.” Belco complied with the terms of the escrow agreement in that the funds were disbursed according to the agreement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Posted in Federal Cases, Real Estate

DC Circuit Court of Appeals: EPA Cannot Create an Affirmative Defense through the Rulemaking Process

Cement PlantFrom the DC Court of Appeals, we have NRDC vs. EPA. The NRDC challenged the EPA’s 2013 cement emission standards rule as well as the EPA’s decision to create an affirmative defense for private civil suits in which plaintiffs sue sources of pollution and seek penalties for violations of emission standards. See Cementing Emission Standards.

In a previous decision, the Court considered EPA’s first attempt to create emission standards for the cement industry, and found the agency’s action arbitrary and capricious. See Portland Cement Association v. EPA, 665 F.3d 177 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Following the ruling, EPA went back to the drawing board and developed the emission standards at issue here, the 2013 Rule. Several environmental organizations, including the Natural Resources Defense Council and the Sierra Club, petitioned for review of the 2013 Rule, arguing primarily that certain aspects of the Rule contravene the Clean Air Act. They also challenged EPA’s decision to create an affirmative defense for private civil suits in which plaintiffs sue sources of pollution and seek penalties for violations of emission standards. EPA’s affirmative defense would be available to defendants in cases where an “unavoidable” malfunction had resulted in impermissible levels of emissions. The Court conclude that the emissions-related provisions of EPA’s 2013 Rule are permissible but that the affirmative defense for private civil suits exceeds EPA’s statutory authority. The court granted the petition in part and vacated the portion of the Rule pertaining to the affirmative defense. All other aspects of the petition were denied.

Posted in Clean Air, EPA, Federal Cases

Preservationists Can Intervene based on Allegation of Failure to Comply with Statutory Requirements for Use of Old School

Old Utica SchoolFrom the Indiana Court of Appeals, we have Old Utica School Preservation, Inc. vs. Utica Township, decided on April 21, 2014. In this case, the Greater Clark County Schools Corporation conveyed the former Utica Elementary School in Jeffersonville to Utica Township. The quitclaim deed contained language stating that the School “shall be used by Utica Township solely1 for park and recreation purposes,” which was written to comply with IC §20-4-5-8 now IC §20-23-6-9.

After Utica Township took ownership of the School, it was open to the public to use and was available for basketball and community gatherings. Utica Township attempted to maintain the School for park and recreation purposes, but it did not have sufficient funds to continue to do so, and the School fell into a state of disrepair. To try to protect the School from further damage, the building was boarded up, but this did not prevent further vandalism and damage. Utica Township was paying approximately $20,000 per year to insure, secure, and maintain the School.

Jacobs Well, Inc., an Indiana non-profit, later leased the School from Utica Township. It invested approximately $300,000 in renovations on the School. The lease required Jacobs Well, Inc. to allow Utica Township access to the gym and cafeteria for the purposes of having community events in the School with fifteen days’ notice.  Jacobs Well, Inc. made a commitment to Utica Township that it would open the building for recreational activities and community functions. Greater Clark Schools was aware of the manner in which Jacobs Well, Inc. intended to use the School, had no objection to such uses, and had not made any effort to reclaim or enforce any interest it has in the property.

Morrison and the Sandefurs own land adjacent to the School. Old Utica School Preservation, Inc. is also a non-profit corporation with the stated purpose “to preserve the school’s historic nature and to find ways in which to use the old school for the benefit of the public.” They filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, contending that Jacobs Well was planning to use the School for purposes other than park and recreation purposes, namely for a residence and “temporary housing or a halfway house for criminal offenders.”  Jacobs Well countered with a motion for summary judgment, contending that the plaintiffs did not have standing to bring the complaint against Jacobs Well.  Finding that they did not have standing, the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint. The citizens group then filed a motion to correct error, which was denied by the trial court.

The Court of Appeals reversed. “… We conclude that the Citizens, and others residents of the township, have an interest in the proper administration of the School for park and recreation purposes.” The matter was remanded for proceedings on the claim.

Posted in Indiana Cases, Planning and Zoning, Real Estate

Neighboring Industrial Property Owners Are Granted Authority to Intervene in Remediation Action

ErtelFrom the Indiana Court of Appeals, we have Moran Electric Service, Inc.and Threaded Rod Company, Inc. vs. IDEM, City of Indianapolis, and Ertel Manufacturing.  Ertel, Moran, and Threaded Rod are the former or current owners of adjacent industrial properties located in Indianapolis.  The properties are contaminated with hazardous chemicals. There is some dispute as to whether the contaminants on the  Moran, and Threaded Rod sites originated on those sites or flowed from the Ertel site. IDEM has demanded that the properties be remediated.

In 2008, the City brought a civil action against Ertel to compel Ertel to reimburse the City for its clean-up costs. In 2009, the trial court entered summary judgment for the City and found that Ertel was liable to the City for cleanup costs.  In 2010, IDEM brought a civil action against Ertel asserting claims under IC §13-25-4 and seeking a declaration that Ertel would be responsible to IDEM for past and future costs associated with the cleanup of the hazardous substances at or flowing from the site. In July 2011, IDEM, the City, Ertel, and various insurance companies entered into an Administrative Agreed Order and a Settlement and Release Agreement.

As part of the two agreements, the insurance companies paid $1,000,000 to IDEM. The funds were placed in two escrow accounts—the first escrow account of $140,000 to reimburse IDEM for its past costs and a second escrow account of $860,000 for IDEM’s future costs. With regard to the second escrow account, IDEM agreed not to use the “funds for any purpose other than for Response Actions at or in connection with the Site.” Any funds remaining after IDEM issued the NFA Letter would be surrendered to the City.

In October 2011, the trial court approved the Ertel Settlement Agreement. In November 2012, IDEM issued the NFA Letter regarding the Ertel site. At that time, $846,000 remained in the second escrow account. In 2013, Moran filed a petition with the Indiana Office of Environmental Adjudication (“OEA”) seeking administrative review of the NFA Letter. Moran argued that, in issuing the NFA Letter regarding the Ertel site, IDEM disregarded off-site migration of the contaminants that had occurred and was continuing to occur. Threaded Rod then filed a petition to intervene in Moran’s objection to IDEM’s issuance of the NFA Letter.

In January 2013, Threaded Rod filed a petition to intervene in the civil action between IDEM and Ertel and requested a temporary restraining order. Threaded Rod argued that the contamination on the Ertel site had migrated to the Threaded Rod site, that the $846,000 was intended to be used to clean up the Ertel site and other sites impacted by the contamination on the Ertel site, and that the funds should be preserved to address concerns on the neighboring properties. According to Threaded Rod, IDEM had abdicated its responsibility to clean up contaminants emanating from the Ertel site in violation of the trial court’s October 2011 order. Moran filed a separate motion to intervene and joined in Threaded Rod’s other motions. The City also filed a petition to intervene, which the trial court granted.

The trial court denied Appellants’ requests for a temporary restraining order. IDEM argued that Appellants were not entitled to intervene in the action and that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the exclusive jurisdiction to review IDEM’s actions rested with the administrative process pursuant to the Administrative Orders. The trial court found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and then ordered IDEM to release the funds in the second escrow account to the City.

The Court of Appeals concluded that the representation of Moran’s and Threaded Rod’s interests by the existing parties was inadequate. It also stated that the trial court abused its discretion by denying their motions to intervene and it erred when it determined that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction.

“The current parties of the two civil actions are IDEM, the City, Ertel, and various insurance companies. Ertel, having been released from liability, has no incentive to represent Appellants’ interests. IDEM’s and the City’s interests in issuing the NFA Letter and distributing the remaining escrowed funds to the City, also appear to conflict with Appellants’ interests in using the remaining escrowed funds to remediate Appellants’ properties,” the Court wrote.

Posted in Hazardous Waste, IDEM, Indiana Cases, Insurance Coverage | 1 Comment

DC Circuit Provides Obama Administration with Major Victory in White Stallion Energy Center v. EPA

White Stallion Energy CenterFrom the DC Court of Appeals, we have White Stalliion Energy vs. EPA — a major victory for the Obama Administration in its effort to impose regulations under the Clean Air Act — requiring oil and gas fired power plants to reduce their emissions of mercury and other hazardous air pollutants.

A cost-benefit analysis under Section 112(n)(1)(A) of the Clean Air Act are as follows: monetized benefits of $37 billion to $90 billion, plus non-monetized benefits above and beyond those amounts. The costs are also significant – approximately $9.6 billion per year. See 77 Fed. Reg. 9306 tbl.2Among the issues before the court was whether the statute requires EPA to consider these costs. The oil and gas industry believes that these cost must be considered. EPA argued that Section 112(n)(1)(A) – which permits it to promulgate regulations that are “appropriate and necessary” to address hazards to public health posed by oil and gas fired power plants does not require the agency to take costs into account.

The three-judge appeals panel was split, with Judge Brett Kavanaugh writing a dissenting opinion criticizing the EPA for not considering what he said was the estimated $9.6 billion a year cost of the regulation.

“To be sure, EPA could conclude that the benefits outweigh the costs. But the problem here is that EPA did not even consider the costs,” Kavanaugh wrote. He agreed with the majority in other aspects of the ruling.

The court majority rejected the representative industries’ argument that the rule was not “appropriate and necessary.” The majority held it was appropriate for cost considerations to be excluded from the EPA’s analysis. The law, the court said in an unsigned opinion, “neither requires EPA to consider costs nor prohibits EPA from doing so.”

Posted in Clean Air, EPA, Federal Cases

Environmental Law & Policy Center Files Suit in Cook Circuit Court (Ill.) to Enjoin $1.3B Illiana Tollway

 

ct-met-xxxx-quick-take-illiana-gfxThe Environmental Law & Policy Center filed the suit in Cook County, Illinois Circuit Court on behalf of the Sierra Club and Openlands to stop the proposed $1.3 billion Illiana Tollway linking northern Illinois and northwestern Indiana. It claims that the Illinois Department of Transportation does not have authority to develop the trucking corridor primarily designed for commercial transport. Essentially, the claim is that the project would destroy important farmland and wildlife habitat.

The proposed highway would be 47 miles in length and would link Interstate 55 in Will County, Illinois and Interstate 65 in Lake County, Indiana.

It also argues that the Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning’s policy committee erred when it voted in October to include the tollway in its long-term development plan for the region. Even though the policy committee included it in the long term plan, the agency’s board voted against the project. The lawsuit argues that board approval is necessary under Illinois law and IDOT cannot legally circumvent statutory requirement.

Illinois Gov. Pat Quinn and Indiana Gov. Mike Pence claim the tollway would help transport goods by truck, reduce congestion and create thousands of jobs. State officials state that private investors will be sought to pay most of the cost for construction, operation and maintenance with tolls repaying state debt. it is estimated that it could take up to 18 years for the tolls to start generating a profit.

The lawsuit against IDOT, the Board of the Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning (CMAP) and the MPO Policy Committee alleges that an October 2013 vote by the MPO Policy Committee to approve amending the GO TO 2040 Plan to include the proposed Illiana Tollway as a financially constrained project was in fact illegal.  State law required that the inclusion of the Illiana Tollway first be approved by the CMAP Board—which rejected the amendment in a 10-4 vote just one week earlier. The lawsuit seeks a court order declaring that the proposed Illiana Tollway hasn’t received the necessary approval to proceed.

Posted in Agriculture, Planning and Zoning

From the Seventh Circuit: HUD-owned Properties — Money Laundering, Fraud, and Theft of Government Funds

FraudFrom the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, we have US vs. Farano — a real estate financing fraud case.

As a result of a real estate financing fraud scheme during the housing bubble, Brunt, Farano, Murphy, and Scullark were charged with mail and wire fraud; Brunt and Scullark with money laundering and Farano with theft of federal government funds, under 18 U.S.C. 641, 1341, 1343, 1957(a).

The scheme involved buying HUD-owned properties at a discount by using a “front” nonprofit corporation that received kickbacks. The properties were resold, with false promises that the defendants would rehabilitate the properties and find tenants. The defendants obtained the mortgages for buyers by submitting false information regarding the conditions of the properties and buyers’ assets, income, employment, and intentions to occupy the properties. A loan officer and appraisers were bribed.

The trial court judge refused to separate the trials. A jury convicted the defendants, and the judge sentenced Brunt to 151 months in prison, Farano to 108, Murphy to 72, and Scullark to 78. He ordered them all to pay restitution.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed except regarding an order of restitution to refinancing lenders, which it vacated for consideration of whether the refinancing banks that are seeking restitution had based their refinancing decisions on fraudulent representations by the defendants. The also court expressed concern about how long the case took.

We would be remiss if we ended this opinion without expressing our concern with the length of time that this case has taken to reach us—six and a half years since indictment. The initial delays were attributable largely to the complexity of the government’s investigation of the defendants, which continued after the indictment was returned and resulted in a superseding indictment that added Murphy as a defendant. Trial was scheduled to begin on January 31, 2011—already more than three years since the initial indictment—but on the eve of trial Brunt switched lawyers, and as a result the trial was postponed nine months; it shouldn’t have been postponed that long for that reason. The trial took nine weeks, and after that the defendants were allowed two months for briefing their motions for acquittal, which was followed seven months later by sentencing. The defendants filed their notices of appeal in July 2012, other than Murphy, who filed in October of that year. The defendants’ lawyers than withdrew, and new counsel were appointed. The appeal was not argued until 19 months after the original notices of appeal. The delay troubles us, especially as there must now be further proceedings in the district court.

Posted in Federal Cases, Real Estate

From the Seventh Circuit: Wire and Mail Fraud Based on Scheme to Assist Homeowners Facing Foreclosure

Foreclosure NoticeFrom the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, we have US vs. Daniel — a real estate wire fraud and mail fraud case.

Daniel was vice president of Rymtech.  Rymtech billed itself as a mortgage reduction program and purported to provide financial assistance to homeowners facing foreclosure. Daniel recruited homeowners to place their properties in the program and instructed them to sign over title to straw purchasers called “A buyers.”

Homeowners were told that title would be placed in trust, that A buyers would obtain financing to pay off the mortgage, and that they would regain clear title in five years. Daniel instructed loan officers to prepare fraudulent loan applications on behalf of A buyers. Even if Rymtech had invested all of the owners’ equity, unrealistically high rates of return would have been required to make the mortgage payments. The equity was actually primarily used to operate Rymtech.

When its finances started to disintegrate, Daniel continued to recruit homeowners. After the program failed Daniel was convicted of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343 and mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and an argument that the court erred in rejecting his proposed instruction, requiring the jury to agree unanimously on a specific fraudulent representation, pretense, promise, or act. Unanimity is only required for the existence of the scheme itself and not in regard to a specific false representation.

Posted in Federal Cases, Real Estate

IDEM Publishes the States’ View of the Air — an Analysis of Air Quality

Air QualityAir quality across the nation has improved over the past ten years or more. The analysis contained in the States View of the Air indicates that progress has been made from 2000 through 2012 for ozone and fine particles (PM-2.5). The national ambient air quality standards in place in 2012 were applied to all time periods in this analysis to demonstrate the progress made.

This is the third year for this report. It was originally intended as a complimentary document to the American Lung Association’s annual report called “The State of the Air.” The report starts with the same air quality data used by the ALA for the period of 2000 – 2012.

The review of data in this report differs from the ALA. First, the design values used for both ozone and PM-2.5 are based on average values for each county. EPA’s guidance for attainment/nonattainment designation purposes focuses on the worst design value for a county. However, some believe that this is inconsistent with what people are actually breathing.

A second difference is that when design values for a number of counties are being grouped to determine the overall value for a metropolitan statistical area, the individual design values for each county are weighted by the population of that county to determine a population weighted average value. This value is believed to be more consistent with what the population is being exposed than the EPA model.

The analysis of Indiana’s data reveals the following:

Ozone.  IDEM believes that significant progress has been made in ozone levels in Indiana. In the 2000 – 2002 time period, approximately 0.2 million people (3.5%) lived in counties that met the ozone standard. By 2010 – 2012 this had increased to approximately 4.0 million people (60.5%). Figure IN-1 shows the distribution of people by year.

24-Hour PM-2.5. It also believes that significant progress has been made in 24-hour PM-2.5 levels in Indiana. In the 2000 – 2002 time period, approximately 1.3 million people (20.5%) lived in counties where 24-hour PM-2.5 levels met the standard. By 2010 -2012 this was approximately 3.7 million people (56.2%) and the rest of the population lived in areas where PM-2.5 was not measured. Figure IN-2 shows the distribution of people by year.

Annual PM-2.5. Finally, some progress has been made in annual PM-2.5 levels in Indiana. In the 2000 – 2002 time period, approximately 1.0 million people (16.0%) lived in counties where annual PM-2.5 levels met the standard. By 2010 – 2012 this had increased to approximately 3.7 million people (56.2%) and the rest of the population lived in areas where PM-2.5 was not measured. Figure IN-3 shows the distribution of people by year.

Not great, but better.

Posted in Clean Air, EPA, IDEM

Indiana Supreme Court Addresses the Applicability Indiana Trial Rules 54(B) and 56(C)

Dry CleanersFrom the Indiana Supreme Court, we have this case handed down on February 20, 2014. Mitchell vs. 10th and Bypass LLC reverses an order granting a motion to vacate partial summary judgment in an environmental remediation action. The Indiana Supreme Court tackled the apparently conflicting Indiana Trial Rules 54(B) and 56(C).

Asserting a claim for an environmental legal action (“ELA”) as set out in Ind. Code §§ 13-30-9 and alleging a violation of Indiana’s anti-dumping statute, see I.C. §§ 13-30-3, 10th and The Bypass, LLC filed a complaint on December 30, 2008 against Mitchell individually, and J.T. Mitchell, Inc.—a corporation Mitchell owned; the Sevan Corporation; and Elway, Inc. (collectively “Defendants”). The complaint alleged that Defendants were responsible for environmental contamination while operating certain dry cleaning businesses at a site owned by the LLC and located on East 10th Street in Bloomington. In particular, according to the complaint, the Defendants “caused and/or contributed to the release of a hazardous substance into the subsurface soil and groundwater of the Site, . . . [and] dumped chlorinated solvents and other solid waste onto the Site without Plaintiff’s consent.”

On June 30, 2009, Mitchell in his individual capacity filed a motion for partial summary judgment on grounds that he was not personally liable for LLC’s damages and that neither the responsible corporate officer doctrine nor the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil was applicable in imposing on him any personal liability. In support of his motion Mitchell designated several exhibits including his affidavit which alleged in pertinent part:

“I never individually operated a dry cleaning business at Plaintiff’s real estate. . . . My involvement in the dry cleaning business at Plaintiff’s real estate was at all times as an officer or employee of J.T. Mitchell, Inc. . . . I never dumped, nor was I at any time involved in any capacity in the dumping of chemical waste on Plaintiff’s real estate. . . . I never caused or contributed to the release of a hazardous substance into the surface or subsurface soil or ground water at Plaintiff’s real estate.”

LLC filed its own motion for partial summary judgment seeking to impose individual liability on Mitchell. In support of the motion LLC designated several exhibits none of which disputed the material substance of Mitchell’s affidavit. After conducting a hearing the trial court entered an order on January 11, 2010 granting Mitchell’s motion for partial summary judgment and denying LLC’s motion. The order declared that there is no evidence that Mitchell caused a spill of hazardous waste or other violation of the ELA or Indiana dumping statutes . . .

Perc FreeBut a year later LLC obtained a recorded statement from a former Mitchell employee who had previously worked at the dry cleaning facility on East 10th Street. According to her, sometime around 1988 or 1989 there was a spill at the facility of a dry cleaning solvent—perchloroethylene - commonly referred to as PERC. The former employee alleged that Mitchell had left the valve open on the back of a 55-gallon PERC drum causing the solvent to spill onto the floor. She asserted that after she informed Mitchell of the spill, he personally instructed her to “mop it up” and to “put a fan on it and it would evaporate.” As a result of the spill and clean-up, she suffered chemical burns and developed other health problems.  Mitchell paid for her medical expenses personally in lieu of submitting a worker’s compensation claim.

Relying on provisions of Indiana Trial Rule 54(B), LLC filed a motion to vacate the trial court’s January 11, 2010 order entering partial summary judgment in Mitchell’s favor. The LLC contended that newly discovered inculpatory evidence established Mitchell’s individual liability. LLC filed a brief in support of its motion and attached Johnson’s statement and deposition as exhibits. Mitchell responded with a memorandum in opposition arguing in part that pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 56 newly discovered evidence must be properly designated and timely submitted—neither of which, according to Mitchell, was done in this case. The trial court entered an order granting LLC’s motion to vacate. The order declared in part the “[o]rder granting partial summary judgment was a non-final order, [and] . . . therefore is subject to revision at any time before entry of a final judgment.” The Court of Appeals granted Mitchell’s petition for interlocutory review and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

In this case, the trial court’s order granting Mitchell’s motion for partial summary judgment was not final. Rule 60(B) was amended (effective January 1, 2009) which is the current version of the Rule, and the Rule in effect at the time the LLC filed its motion. The amendment deleted the word “final” such that the rule now provides in relevant part, “the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a judgment, including a judgment by default. . . .” So the express language of the rule no longer limits relief only from a “final” judgment . In light of the  amendment, LLC is not precluded from seeking Trial Rule 60(B) relief from the trial court’s January 2010 order on grounds that the order was not a final judgment. On this point the Indiana Supreme Court held that the trial court erred and reversed.

Posted in Clean Water, Hazardous Waste, Indiana Cases, Real Estate